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CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS AGAINST
HOSPITALS-CAN THE PLAINTIFF PROVE A
CASE?
In Pedroza v. Bryant' the Washington Supreme Court expressly
adopted the theory of hospital corporate negligence. 2 Under this theory, a
hospital has an independent duty to use reasonable care in selecting and
evaluating its medical staff members. 3 A week after the Pedroza deci-
sion, the Washington Supreme Court, in Coburn v. Seda,4 held that the
1. 101 Wn. 2d 226,677 P.2d 166(1984).
2. Id. at 233, 677 P.2d at 170. Maria Pedroza was near the end of her pregnancy when she
became ill and began to exhibit the classical signs and symptoms of pre-eclampsia. She visited the
office of her private physician, Dr. Bryant, and was advised to take aspirin and remain at home in
bed. Two days later she was brought to the hospital in a coma, having suffered an intracerebral
hemorrhage resulting from eclampsia. She was admitted and treated by another physician, but within
a week she died. Id. at 227-28, 677 P.2d at 167-68.
Mrs. Pedroza's husband sued Dr. Bryant and the hospital where he was a medical staff member.
Mr. Pedroza alleged that Dr. Bryant negligently treated his wife, and that the hospital was negligent
in granting staff privileges to Dr. Bryant. He also alleged that this breach of duty proximately caused
Mrs. Pedroza's death. The hospital moved for summary judgment dismissing the claims against it,
and the trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment because Mrs.
Pedroza was not a patient of the defendant hospital when the allegedly negligent acts occurred. Id. at
237, 677 P.2d at 172. The court, however, expressly recognized that such an action could be brought
in a case where the physician's negligent acts occurred within the hospital. Id.
3. Id. at 230, 677 P.2d at 168-69. Discussion of the theory can be found in Copeland, Hospital
Responsibility for Basic Care Provided by Medical Staff Members: "Am I my Brother's Keeper?" 5
N. KY. L. REv. 27 (1978); Goldberg, The Duty of Hospitals and Hospital Medical Staffs to Regulate
the Quality of Patient Care: A Legal Perspective, 14 PAc. L.J. 55 (1982); Lisko, Hospital Liability
Under Theories of Respondeat Superior and Corporate Negligence, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 171
(1978); Loveridge & Kimball, Hospital Corporate Negligence Comes to California: Questions in the
Wake of Elam v. College Park Hospital, 14 PAc. L.J. 803 (1983); Ludlam, Tie Impact of the Darling
Decision upon the Practice of Medicine and Hospitals, I I FORUM 756 (1976); Payne, Recent De-
velopments Affecting a Hospital's Liabilityfor Negligence of Physicians, 18 S. TEx. L.J. 389 (1977);
Slawkowski, Do the Courts Understand the Realities of Hospital Practices?, 22 ST. Louis U.L.J.
452 (1978); Strodel, The Impaired Physician-Hospital Corporate Liability, 24 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
488 (1980); Zaremski & Spitz, Liability of a Hospital As an Institution: Are the Walls of Jericho
Tumbling?, 16 FORUM 225 (1980); Zaslow, Vicarious Liability of a Hospital for Tortious Acts of its
Independent Contractors Delivering Medical Care, 49 PA. B.A.Q. 466 (1978); Note, Wisconsin
Hospital Held to Owe a Duty to its Patients to Select Qualified Physicians, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 139
(1981); Comment, Hospital May Be Held Liable for Permitting Incompetent Independent Physician
to Operate, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 177 (1976); Note, Hospital Corporate Liability: An Effective Solution
to Controlling Private Physician Incomptence?, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 342 (1979) [hereinafter Note,
Hospital Corporate Liability]; Comment, Piercing the Doctrine of Corporate Hospital Liability. 17
SAN DiEGo L. REv. 383 (1980); Note, Corporate Negligence of Hospitals and the Duty to Monitor
and Oversee Medical Treatment, 17 WAKE FOREST L. Rav. 309 (1981); Comment, Tie Hospital-
Physician Relationship: Hospital Responsibility for Malpractice of Physicians. 50 WASH. L. REv.
385 (1975) [hereinafter Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship].
4. 101 Wn. 2d 270, 677 P.2d 173 (1984). Denny Coburn died while undergoing a cardiac cathet-
erization procedure at Kadlec Hospital. His family brought a medical malpractice action against the
hospital and the physician who performed the procedure. During discovery the plaintiffs sought infor-
913
Washington Law Review Vol. 59:913, 1984
proceedings, reports and written records of hospital quality review com-
mittees5 are shielded from discovery in a medical malpractice action by
section 4.24.250 of the Washington Revised Code. 6 If the Coburn deci-
sion is extended to apply to corporate negligence actions, a plaintiff in
such an action may find it impossible to meet his or her burden of proof.7
Unless this proof problem can be overcome, the theory of corporate negli-
gence could become a practical nullity in Washington.
This Comment first explains the theory of corporate negligence as
adopted in Washington and describes the role of a hospital's quality re-
view committees in fulfilling the hospital's corporate duty. It then re-
views present law on the use of committee records in litigation. Next, this
Comment considers the conflict between the goals of protecting medical
staff committee records and permitting recovery in corporate negligence
actions. It concludes that medical staff committee records should be pro-
tected from discovery in hospital corporate negligence actions and that
the evidentiary use of hospital quality review committee records should
be prohibited as well. Because this extended protection will create proof
problems for hospital corporate negligence plaintiffs, this Comment pro-
poses that the court adopt an in camera review proceeding to permit such
plaintiffs access to hospital records of former patients of the physician
whose alleged negligence caused the plaintiff's injury.
mation concerning a review committee at the defendant hospital, which had investigated the incident.
When the defendant hospital refused to divulge the requested information, the plaintiffs moved to
compel the hospital to answer their interrogatory and produce the committee's written report. The
trial court granted the motion. On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed, finding that §
4.24.250 of the Washington Revised Code shielded such information from discovery in medical mal-
practice actions. Id. at 279, 677 P.2d at 179.
5. A hospital can best meet its corporate duty through the efforts of quality review committees
composed of hospital medical staff members.
6. 101 Wn. 2d at 271, 677 P.2d at 174. WASH REv. CODE. § 4.24.250 (1983) reads as follows:
Any health care provider as defined in RCW 7.70.020 (1) and (2) as now existing or hereafter
amended who, in good faith, files charges or presents evidence against another member of their
profession based on the claimed incompetency or gross misconduct of such person before a
regularly constituted review committee or board of a professional society or hospital whose duty
it is to evaluate the competency and qualifications of members of the profession, including limit-
ing the extent of practice of such person in a hospital or similar institution, or before a regularly
constituted committee or board of a hospital whose duty it is to review and evaluate the quality
of patient care, shall be immune from civil action for damages arising out of such activities. The
proceedings, reports, and written records of such committees or boards, or of a member, em-
ployee, staff person, or investigator of such a committee or board, shall not be subject to sub-
poena or discovery proceedings in any civil action, except actions arising out of the recommen-
dations of such committees or boards involving the restriction or revocation of the clinical or
staff privileges of a health care provider as defined above.
7. See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Corporate Negligence Theory
Prior to the adoption of the corporate negligence theory in Washington,
a patient injured by a physician's negligent act had limited remedies. She
could bring an action against the physician, or, in rare cases, against the
hospital for breach of its independent duty of care. 8 The hospital, how-
ever, was not liable for negligent selection or evaluation of the physicians
allowed to practice within the institution. Under the corporate negligence
theory a hospital that fails to exercise reasonable care in the selection and
evaluation of a non-employee medical staff member may be liable if that
staff member negligently injures a hospitalized patient.9 This expansion
of hospital liability is justified for several reasons.
First, the expanded role of hospitals as health care providers warrants
an increase in the scope of their liability. Historically, the hospital was
seen as a physical plant in which the physician, as an independent con-
tractor, found the proper facilities for the practice of medicine. 10 The le-
gal obligations of the institution were thus appropriately limited to the
exercise of reasonable care in the maintainence of the facilities and the
8. In two prior cases the Washington Supreme Court impliedly recognized that the hospital owed
an independent duty of care to its patients. In Pederson v. Dumouchel, 72 Wn. 2d 73, 431 P.2d 973
(1967), the hospital was held liable for permitting a dental operation to proceed without the presence
of a medical doctor in the operating room as required by the hospital's rules. Id. at 80, 431 P.2d at
978. In Osborn v. Public Hosp. Dist., 80 Wn. 2d 201, 205-06, 492 P.2d 1025, 1028 (1972), it was
recognized that the defendant hospital had an independent statutory duty of care for the safety of its
patients. Until Pedroza, however, no Washington case had recognized the hospital's duty to regularly
evaluate the competence of its medical staff members.
9. Pedroza, 101 Wn. 2d at 229, 677 P.2d at 168. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial
Hosp., 33 I11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253, 258 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966), was the
landmark decision that established that a hospital may be held liable for failure to require hospital
staff review of the treatment given by one of its physicians.
Following Darling, jurisdiction after jurisdiction moved toward a recognition of the hospital's cor-
porate duty to exercise reasonable care in evaluating the quality of care given by its medical staff
members. See, e.g., Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch, 113 Ariz. 34, 545 P.2d 958 (1976);
Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1982); Kitto v. Gilbert, 570
P.2d 544 (Colo. App. 1977); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hosp. Auth., 125 Ga. App. 1, 186 S.E.2d
307 (1971), affd, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Ferguson v. Gonyaw, 64 Mich. App. 685,
236 N.W.2d 543 (1975); Gridley v. Johnson, 476 S.W.2d 475 (Mo. 1972); Foley v. Bishop Clarkson
Memorial Hosp., 185 Neb. 89, 173 N.W.2d 881 (1970); Moore v. Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d
605 (Nev.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hosp., 138 N.J. Super.
302, 350 A.2d 534 (1975); Felice v. St. Agnes Hosp., 65 A.D.2d 388, 411 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1978);
Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. App.), disc. rev. denied. 300 N.C. 194, 269 N.E.2d 621
(1980); Utter v. United Hosp. Center, Inc., 236 S.E.2d 213 (W. Va. 1977); Johnson v. Misericordia
Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156 (1981).
10. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change Its Relation-
ship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 429, 434 (1973); see also Schloendorff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 94 (1914).
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selection of employees. 11 In recent years, however, the role of the com-
munity hospital has expanded to meet the demand for sophisticated health
care services. The hospital now provides not only the specialized consul-
tants and costly diagnostic equipment necessary for the care of many hos-
pitalized patients, but also often holds itself out as a community resource
for outpatient and emergency care. 12 Increased public reliance on the hos-
pital for health care services should result in a corresponding increase in
the scope of the hospital's legal obligations. 13
Second, the expansion of hospital liability provides hospitals with a
financial incentive to monitor the quality of medical care given by their
staff members. 14 The hospital is in a particularly good position to survey
physician performance because professional practices can be observed
regularly at the site where the care is being rendered. 15 Furthermore, the
hospital can make use of its organized medical staff to accurately assess
the quality of care delivered by other physicians. 16
Third, the doctrine of respondeat superior has been unsatisfactory as a
basis for holding a hospital liable for the negligence of its staff mem-
bers. 17 Physicians have traditionally been categorized as independent
contractors, 18 whose practice of medicine is not subject to the control of
I1. Southwick, supra note 10. at 434.
12. Id. at 435; see also Pedroza. 101 Wn. 2d at 231.677 P.2d at 169.
13. Pedroza. 101 Wn. 2d at 231, 677 P.2d at 169.
14. Id. at 232. 677 P.2d at 170. But see Note. Hospital Corporate Liability. supra note 3. at 379
(arguing that non-profit hospitals may not respond to increased liability by undertaking a more active
role in ensuring physician competence because they lack a profit motive).
15. Pedroza, 101 Wn. 2d at 231-32, 677 P.2d at 169.
16. See infra Part IB: see generally Southwick. supra note 10. at 437.
17. This theory assigns vicarious liability to an employer for the torts of employees acting within
the scope of their employment and is based on the employer's right to control the employee's manner
of performance. W. PROSSER. THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 69-70 (4th ed. 1971). In two classes of factual
situations, courts used respondeat superior to find the hospital vicariously liable for the negligence of
a medical staff member. The first class of cases held that a salaried arrangement between the hospital
and physician was sufficient to impute the latter's negligence to the former. See. e.g.. Gilstrap v.
Osteopathic Sanatorium Co., 24 S.W.2d 249 (Mo. App. 1929) (hospital liable for the salaried physi-
cian's negligent performance of a tonsillectomy); Bryant v. Sweet Clinic. 167 Wash. 166.8 P.2d 972
(1932) (medical clinic liable for negligence of salaried surgeon); Vaughan v. Memorial Hosp.. 130
S.E. 481 (W. Va. 1925) (hospital liable for negligence of physicians it supplied pursuant to contract).
The second line of cases held that the hospital had created the appearance of an employer-em-
ployee relationship. Under this reasoning the hospital was estopped from asserting the independent
contractor status of the physician as a defense because it supplied the physician's services as though it
were an employer. See, e.g., Beeck v. Tucson Gen. Hosp.. 18 Ariz. App. 165. 500 P.2d 1153
(1972) (hospital liable for negligence of radiologist where patient had no choice of physician due to
exclusive service contract); Seneris v. Haas. 291 P.2d 915 (Cal. 1955) (hospital vicariously liable for
negligent acts of unsalaried anesthesiologist): Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp.. 20 Wn. App. 98. 579
P.2d 970 (1978) (summary judgment for hospital inappropriate where jury could have found that
hospital "held itself out" as providing medical care to public).
18. For a discussion of independent contractor status, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
250 (1958).
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the hospital's board of directors. Thus, the doctrine does not closely fit
the physician-hospital relationship. 19 Judicial attempts to base hospital li-
ability on respondeat superior have resulted in a distortion of the doc-
trine.20 Moreover, in jurisdictions unwilling to stretch the doctrine, plain-
tiffs have been denied any recovery against the hospital.2 1
B. The Role of Hospital Committee Review in Preventing Corporate
Negligence
In Pedroza, the Washington Supreme Court suggested that the stan-
dards of care to which hospitals will be held are those of the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH).22 These standards require
the hospital medical staff to organize into committees for the purpose of
regularly evaluating the quality of medical care given within the institu-
tion.23 Mandatory state regulations also require that hospitals have orga-
nizational patterns capable of conducting quality assurance review. 24
19. Comment, The Hospital-Physician Relationship, supra note 3, at 388; see also Southwick,
Vicarious Liability of Hospitals, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 153, 154 (1960).
20. The cases reflect a willingness on the part of the judiciary to adapt the doctrine of respondeat
superior to cover the hospital-physician relationship in spite of the absence of any real control by the
hospital over the medical practice of the physician. Southwick, supra note 19, at 182.
21. See, e.g., Mayers v. Litlow, 316 P.2d 351, 354 (Cal. 1957) (no master-servant relationship
where physician was independent practitioner even though a member of the hospital's medical staff);
Overstreet v. Doctor's Hosp., 142 Ga. App. 895, 237 S.E.2d 213 (1977) (respondeat superior not
appropriate where hospital had no right to control medical practice); Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19
N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 299, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373, 378 (1967) (hospital cannot direct the medi-
cal practice of the private physicians on its staff).
22. Pedroza v. Bryant, 101 Wn. 2d 233-34, 677 P.2d 170-71. The JCAH is a private, non-profit
organization that establishes minimum standards for hospital patient care. It was organized in 1952 to
standardize hospital practices throughout the nation. Commission accreditation can be gained only by
following its recommendations. See Langhenry, Immunity of In-Hospital Staff Committee Members
and Confidentiality of Staff Committee Records, 24 FED'N OF INS. Couts. Q. 3, 4 (1974).
The recommendations of the JCAH are provided to each participating institution in its annual
Accreditation Manual for Hospitals. JCAH standards mandate that the governing body of the hospital
is ultimately responsible for the overall quality of patient care provided in the institution. Joint Com-
mission of Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals 1983 Edition 151. Thus,
in order to comply with JCAH standards, the hospital's medical staff must be organized in such a way
that it can conduct regular reviews for the governing board.
23. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for Hospitals 1983
Edition 106.
24. WASH. REv. CODE 70.41.010 (1983), for example, declares that in order to promote safe and
adequate care of individuals in hospitals the state board of health shall establish standards, rules, and
regulations for the construction, maintainence, and operation of hospitals. Pursuant to this statutory
grant of authority, the board promulgated WASH. ADMIN. CODE R. 248-18-030 (1980), which recom-
mends that the medical staff be organized and perform its functions in accordance with the standards
of the JCAH or those of the Bureau of Hospitals of the American Osteopathic Association.
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These internal evaluations are essential if the hospital is to avoid liability
for the negligent acts of its medical staff members.2 5
Medical staff committees perform two basic quality assurance func-
tions for the hospital's governing board. First, they evaluate the qualifica-
tions and competence of hospital staff members. 26 Because the governing
board of the hospital is usually composed of lay members who are not
prepared to assess the professional credentials of medical staff members,
the responsibility to perform such evaluations must be delegated to the
medical staff itself. 27 This function is usually performed by a credentials
committee 28 which reviews all applications for renewal of staff privi-
leges. This committee also conducts investigations into possible reduc-
tion or removal of such privileges.
Second, as agents of the hospital's governing board, the medical staff
committees evaluate the quality of patient care given within the institu-
tion. 29 The committees or departments responsible for this assessment
may review particular classes of cases such as deaths, unexpected compli-
cations, or prolonged hospitalizations, or they may make use of internal
audit procedures to find cases that do not comport with established crite-
ria. 30 The committee members then review the care rendered in such
cases, identify deficiencies, and communicate their findings to the medi-
cal staff members responsible. These committees may also refer their
conclusions to the credentials committee for action if they decide the staff
member's performance warrants a review of his or her staff privileges. 3'
Medical staff committees are essential if the hospital is to meet its inde-
pendent duty to maintain a competent medical staff. Only through this
ongoing review process can the hospital be made aware of physician in-
competence.
25. Southwick, supra note 10, at 437.
26. See Hall, Hospital Committee Proceedings and Reports: Their Legal Status. I AM J.L. &
MED 245. 248-49 (1975).
27. See Southwick, supra note 10, at 437.
28. A thorough discussion of committee structure can be found in Langhenry. supra note 22. at
3; see also Copeland, supra note 3, at 47; Hall, supra note 26, at 248-50: Holbrook & Dunn. Medi-
cal Malpractice Litigation: The Discoverability and Use of Hospitals' QualitY Assurance Committee
Records, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 54, 57-63 (1976).
29. Langhenry, supra note 28, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id. A third medical staff responsibility delegated by the hospital governing body is that of
utilization review. The Federal Medical Act of 1965 requires hospitals to create committees to review
the utilization of hospital services. 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-l(a)(1)(B) (1972). These committees are
charged with evaluating the medical necessity of hospitalization in order to prevent unjustified use of
hospital services paid for with medicare benefits. They review cases that exceed length-of-stay
norms, or that are brought to their attention by hospital staff members, and forward their conclusions
to the attending physician. Habitual length-of-stay problems on the part of a particular medical staff
member could prompt the committee to request further evaluation by another medical staff review
committee.
Vol. 59:913, 1984
Negligence Actions Against Hospitals
C. Protection of Hospital Committee Records
Hospital review committee records contain several kinds of docu-
ments. Information gathered by the committee for review may include
statistical data from in-hospital audits, patient records, written complaints
and memoranda from individuals or other committees, and references or
evaluations of personnel from other institutions. Information produced by
the committee may include inquiries or criticisms in the form of letters to
individual physicians, memoranda that communicate its findings to other
committees and the hospital's governing board, and minutes of the com-
mittee meetings.
Section 4.24.250 of the Washington Revised Code provides that the
proceedings, reports, and written records of hospital medical staff com-
mittees shall not be subject to subpoena or discovery proceedings in any
civil action except one arising out of committee recommendations involv-
ing the restriction or revocation of the staff privileges of a health care
provider. 32 In Coburn, the Washington Supreme Court construed this
32. WASH. REV. CODE 4.24.250 (1983). Modem rules of discovery permit parties to "obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action." WASH. C.R. 26(b)( 1). The broad scope of this provision is intended to aid parties in
preparation for litigation, to narrow the issues during the pretrial process and thus conserve judicial
resources, and to facilitate the search for the truth by bringing out all the available facts. C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1970). To effectuate these goals, courts
have generally construed the rules of discovery liberally. See, e.g.. Bushman v. New Holland Div. of
Sperry Rand Corp., 83 Wn. 2d 429, 434, 518 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1974). However, medical staff
committee review procedures demand both frank discussion by the committee members and candid
participation by the physician being reviewed. This deliberative process would be stifled by permit-
ting its discovery.
In jurisdictions where there is no controlling non-discovery statute, courts have reached different
results, based on these conflicting policies. Compare Bredice v. Doctors Hosp.. Inc.. 50 F.R.D. 249,
250 (D.D.C. 1970) (importance of candid and conscientious evaluation in ensuring quality health
care outweighs the plaintiff's interest in discovery), affd. 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973), with Wes-
ley Medical Center v. Clark, 243 Kan. 13. 669 P.2d 209 (1983) (public interest in allowing parties
access to relevant material outweighs the interest in furthering peer review processes).
These polar results, produced by courts balancing the same public policy arguments, illustrate that
the strength of such policies is, as one court put it. "nearly in equipoise." Davidson v. Light, 79
F.R.D. 137, 139 (D. Colo. 1978). As the pretrial value of medical staff committee reports became
more apparent and early decisions on their discoverability proved unpredictable, state legislatures
began to enact statutes aimed at their protection. See, e.g.. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1157 (West Supp.
1984); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-43.5-103 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. § 768.40 (West Supp. 1984): GA.
CODE ANN. § 88-3204 (Supp. 1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.61 et. seq.: N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 6527.3
(MeKinney Supp. 1983-84). Cases construing these statutes have, for the most part, honored the
legislative public policy choice in favor of confidentiality. See. e.g.. Matchett v. Superior Court, 40
Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1974) (protective statute represents legislative choice in
favor of medical staff candor at cost of impairing plaintiff's access to evidence); Texarkana Memorial
Hosp. Inc. v. Jones, 551 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1977) (statute precludes disclosure of hospital com-
mittee minutes in a medical malpractice action). But see Young v. King. 136 N.J. Super. 127, 344
A.2d 792, 794 (1975) (statute does not preclude discovery of records of audit committee, tissue
committee, infection control committee, and medical council).
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statute to protect committee records from discovery in medical malprac-
tice actions. 33 The court noted that such protection is necessary to encour-
age the frank committee discussions necessary for thorough quality re-
view. 34 The court warned, however, that if information is otherwise
available from its original sources, it cannot be immunized by introducing
it at a review committee meeting. 35
While medical staff committee records are not discoverable in civil ac-
tions, their admission into evidence is not expressly prohibited by section
4.24.250.36 Although recognizing that policy considerations might war-
rant a full evidentiary privilege, the Coburn court reserved that question
and held only that the statute created an immunity from discovery.
37
Thus, the general rules of evidence would probably govern the admissi-
bility of such records. 38
The public policy considerations that prompted these protective statutes are the same ones dis-
cussed in earlier cases. However, because the statutes reflect a legislative preference for conliden-
tiality. their existence has been enough to tip the scales in favor of non-discoverability of medical
staff committee records in most jurisdictions. See Morse v. Gerity. 520 F. Supp. 470 (D. Conn.
1981): Tucson Medical Center, Inc. v. Misevch. 113 Ariz. 34. 545 P.2d 958 (1976): Posey v. Dis-
trict Court. 586 P.2d 36 (Colo. 1978): Danklef v. Wilmington Medical Center. 429 A.2d 509 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1981): Hollowell v. Jove. 247 Ga. 678. 279 S.E.2d 430 (1981): Murphy v. Wood. 105
Idaho App. 180. 667 P.2d 859 (1983): Mennes v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 Ill. App.
3d 1029, 427 N.E.2d 952 (1981): Oviatt v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp.. 191 Neb. 224. 214
N.W.2d 490 (1974): City of Edmond v. Parr. 587 P.2d 56 (Okla. 1978). But see Good Samaritan
Hosp. Ass'n v. Simon, 370 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979): Walker v. Alton Memorial
Hosp., 91 111. App. 3d 310,414 N.E.2d 850 (1980): Marchand v. Henry Ford Hosp.. 398 Mich. 163.
247 N.W.2d 280 (1976): Kalish v. Mt. Sinai Hosp.. 270 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1978).
33. Cobumv. Seda, 101 Wn. 2d 270, 271. 677 P.2d 173. 174(1984).
34. Id. at 273-74. 677 P.2d at 176.
35. Id. at 277, 677 P.2d at 177. The court remanded the case for the trial court's determination of
whether the Kadlec Hospital committee was a regularly constituted hospital committee whose duty it
was to review and evaluate the quality of patient care. In making this determination the court said that
the trial judge should consider the guidelines and standards of the JCAH. the hospital's own regula-
tions and bylaws, and whether the committee's function is one of current patient care or retrospective
review. Id. at 277-78, 677 P.2d at 178.
The court held that if the committee was a regularly constituted hospital committee whose duty it
was to review and evaluate the quality of patient care, then the defendant hospital would be obligated
to disclose only the existence and name of the committee, and the location and time of the review. I.
at 278, 677 P.2d at 178. Any other disclosure would interfere with the statute's purpose of encourag-
ing effective quality review.
36. The issue of admissibility of committee proceedings and records is distinct from that of their
discoverability. Information that is relevant and not privileged may nevertheless be inadmissible be-
cause it violates one of the formal requirements of the rules of evidence or because its prejudicial
impact outweighs its probative value. Conversely, a party in possession of non-discoverable material
may desire to offer it as evidence.
37. Coburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 274-75. 677 P.2d at 177.
38. Whether medical staff committee records are admissible depends first on whether they are
relevant to the issues in the case. FED R. EviD 402: WASfi R. EVID 402. When the litigation is
limited to the issue of a particular physician's negligence, committee records are least likely to be
admissible. For example. the probative value of a committee finding that the defendant physician had
rendered substandard care in previous cases would be outweighed by its prejudicial impact. FED R.
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II. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PROTECTING HOSPITAL
COMMITTEE RECORDS AND PERMITTING HOSPITAL
CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS
The legal system can encourage quality health care in different ways.
In Pedroza, the Washington Supreme Court chose a direct method when
it imposed on hospitals the legal obligation to assure the competence of
their medical staff members. 39 The threat of potential litigation may well
motivate hospitals to use reasonable care in the selection and periodic
evaluation of the physicians who use their facilities. In Coburn, on the
other hand, the court recognized that quality health care could be indi-
rectly promoted by protecting the internal quality assurance process from
discovery by malpractice plaintiffs. 40 This protection is intended to facili-
tate the candid and conscientious review necessary for continual improve-
ment in hospital medical care.
Although these two decisions have the same goal, the methods adopted
by each may conflict in application and interfere with the achievement of
that goal. If the protection offered by the Coburn decision is extended to
preclude discovery of medical staff committee records in hospital corpo-
rate negligence actions, plaintiffs may be unable to produce the evidence
necessary to substantiate a claim. The deterrent effect of Pedroza will
thus be lost. Conversely, if an allegation of hospital corporate negligence
can unlock the doors of the internal review process in every medical mal-
practice action, the protection offered by Coburn will be destroyed.
These two cases will promote quality health care only if the proof
EvID. 403; WASH. R. EvID. 403; see also Hall. supra note 26, at 279-80. Furthermore, such a finding
might well be excluded on the ground that it contains conclusions that would invade the province of
the jury. FED. R. EvID. 701; WASH. R. EvID. 701: see also Hall. supra note 26. at 280. However.
when the plaintiff alleges that the hospital was negligent in failing to monitor the defendant physi-
cian's performance. the review committee's work is put directly in issue. See Hall. supra note 26. at
281; see also Loveridge & Kimball, supra note 3. at 826.
The second possible barrier to the admissibility of review committee records is the hearsay rule.
Evidence is classified as hearsay if it is an out-of-court statement, offered in court, to establish the
truth of the matter asserted. FED. R. EvID. 801: WASH. R. EvID. 801: see also C. MCCORNICK. THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 460 (1954). Such evidence is deemed unreliable because the person making the
out-of-court statement cannot be examined for faulty perception. erroneous memory. insincerity, or
ambiguity. C. MCCORMICK. supra at 460. Hospital committee records are usually classified as hear-
say evidence. Judd v. Park Ave. Hosp.. 235 N.Y.S.2d 843. 845-46 (Sup. Ct.). i.jfd. 235 N.Y.S.2d
1023 (App. Div. 1962). Although such records could fall within the "'business records" exception to
the hearsay rule, WASH. REV. CODE § 5.45.020 (1983). they would usually contain second levels of
hearsay for which there would be no exception. However, if such records are introduced to demon-
strate that the defendant hospital had notice of prior physician incompetence, they would not be
hearsay at all because they would not be offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
39. Pedroza v. Bryant. 101 Wn. 2d 226. 233. 677 P.2d 1666 170(1984).
40. Cobum v. Seda. 101 Wn. 2d 270. 271. 677 P.2d 173. 174(1984).
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problems of a hospital corporate negligence action can be overcome with-
out a corresponding disruption of the medical staff review committee pro-
cess.
A. Protection of Committee Records Should be Extended to Corporate
Negligence Actions
1. Discovery
Section 4.24.250 allows discovery of medical staff review committee
records in civil actions arising out of committee recommendations that
involve restriction or revocation of physician privileges. 41 Hospital cor-
porate negligence is based on the theory that the hospital breached a duty
to the plaintiff when it failed to restrict or revoke the privileges of an
incompetent physician; 42 therefore, such an action could fall within this
statutory exception. This exception, however, should not be construed to
allow discovery in hospital corporate negligence actions.
First, this exception was apparently drafted to allow discovery in suits
by physicians claiming arbitrary or wrongful exclusion from the hospital
medical staff.43 Many protective statutes in other jurisdictions contain ex-
ceptions that permit discovery by physicians who are bringing suit for
wrongful restriction or revocation of their hospital privileges. 44 These ex-
ceptions are based on the particular relevancy of the records in such ac-
tions, 45 and the need for plaintiff access to prevent peer review groups
from being used for anti-competitive purposes. 46 The exception in section
4.24.250 was drafted to permit discovery in such cases.
41. WASH REV CODE§4.24.250(1983).
42. See supra Part IA.
43. When the statute was discussed in the Washington legislature before its enactment, one rep-
resentative noted the purpose of the exception: -[tihis particular language makes an exception that
the written records will be available in the instance where the doctor appeals from the hospital review
board's decision to the court.- HOUSE JOURNAL OF THE FORTY-SECOND LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON 876-77 (1971).
44. See, e.g.. COLO REV STAT § 12-43.5-102 (Supp. 1978) (records not protected in actions by
physicians seeking review of committee action): ILL_ ANN STAT ch. 110, § 8-2101 (Smith-Hurd
1984) (claim of confidentiality shall not be invoked to deny physician access to data upon which staff
privileges decision was based); MD HEALTH OCC_ CODE ANN § 14-601(e)(1) (1981) (discovery al-
lowed in action by person aggrieved by committee decision): R.I. GEN LAWS §§ 23-17-24. 23-17-25
(1979) (records available in actions arising out of sanctions imposed); see also Schulz v. Superior
Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1977) (statutory exception permits discovery in suits
by physicians claiming wrongful exclusion from hospital staff).
45. Robinson v. Magovem, 83 F.R.D. 79, 89 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (discovery request went to heart
of issue of plaintiff's denial of staff privileges).
46. Id: see also Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058 (7th Cir. 1981) (action for unlawful
restraint of trade); Ott v. St. Luke Hosp., 522 F. Supp. 706 (E.D. Ky. 1981) (civil rights action based
on denial of staff privileges).
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Second, the policy reasons for protecting the records from discovery in
medical malpractice actions apply with equal force in hospital corporate
negligence actions. As the Coburn court stated, the prohibition against
discovery in medical malpractice actions encourages the candor and con-
structive criticism necessary for effective quality review. 47 However, it is
not only the apprehension that a committee member's suggestion will be
used as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit48
that stifles frank and open discussion. Rather, the risk that the committee
records will be opened for public perusal is sufficient to discourage both
complaints and free discussion about the competence of medical staff
members. 49 Therefore, even though the defendant in a hospital corporate
negligence action is not a colleague of the committee members, the dis-
covery of committee records in such a suit would be enough to discourage
effective quality assurance.
Finally, in most hospital corporate negligence actions the plaintiff is
probably also suing the medical staff member whose malpractice caused
the injury. Allowing discovery in such cases based on the corporate negli-
gence claim would dilute the protection offered by section 4.24.250 and
the Coburn decision: the plaintiff could not be prevented from using the
discovered information in preparation for the malpractice suit. Further-
more, such a decision would result in allegations of hospital corporate
negligence in every medical malpractice action solely for the purpose of
circumventing the discovery prohibition.
2. Evidentiary Use
The issue of the admissibility of hospital medical staff committee rec-
ords could arise in two ways. First, if such records were inadvertently
disclosed by a hospital during the discovery process, the plaintiff in a
hospital corporate negligence case might offer them into evidence. Sec-
ond, the hospital might offer them into evidence in its defense.
Although the admission of medical staff committee records in civil ac-
tions is not expressly prohibited by section 4.24.250, the policy reasons
that preclude discovery of such records should also prevent their evidenti-
ary use. The disclosure of medical staff committee proceedings during
trial would damage the quality review process no less than the pretrial
discovery of such information. The possibility of exposure to an entire
courtroom stifles a committee member's candid criticism just as surely as
47. Coburn, 101 Wn. 2d at 275, 677 P.2d at 176; see also Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50
F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
48. Dade County Med. Ass'n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
49. Schulz v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. App. 3d 440, 136 Cal. Rptr. 67,70 (1977).
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the chance of perusal by a malpractice plaintiff. The evidentiary use of
these records, like their discovery, should be prohibited in hospital corpo-
rate negligence actions in order to preserve the effectiveness of the com-
mittee review process.
Considerations of fairness also demand that these records be excluded
from evidence. The defendant hospital should not be permitted to deny
the plaintiff pretrial access to material that it intends to use in its own
defense. 50 However, at the present time there are no safeguards against
such surprise tactics.
The Washington courts should extend the protection of section
4.24.250 to immunize medical staff committee records from discovery in
hospital corporate negligence actions. This would preserve the confiden-
tial nature of such proceedings and ultimately result in improved hospital
care for the Washington health consumer.
B. Inadequacy of Alternative Means of ProofAvailable to Plaintiffs in
Corporate Negligence Actions Under Present Law
If the protection of section 4.24.250 is extended to prevent the discov-
ery or evidentiary use of medical staff review committee records in hospi-
tal corporate negligence actions, the plaintiff may be unable to produce
the evidence necessary to prove her case. Such evidence would have to
establish that, prior to the plaintiff's injury, the hospital had sufficient
notice of the physician's incompetence to cause a reasonable institution to
limit or revoke that physician's privileges. 5 1
In some cases the plaintiff will be able to find outside evidence of phy-
sician incompetence, which a reasonable investigation by the hospital
would have revealed. Previous dismissals from other hospital staffs, 52 in-
adequate training, 53 other malpractice actions, 54 suspension or revocation
of a license to practice, and testimony of other persons who were injured
by the negligent physician while patients in the defendant hospital 55 could
all be used to show that the hospital knew, or should have known, that the
physician was incompetent. In many cases, however, such outside
50. See generally Hall. supra note 26, at 277-78.
51. This proof problem was recognized by the California court in Matchett v. Superior Court. 40
Cal. App. 3d 623, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320-21 (1974), where it commented that the protective statute
might seriously jeopardize or even preclude the plaintiff's recovery.
52. See, e.g., Johnson v. Misericordia Comm. Hosp.. 99 Wis. 2d 708. 301 N.W.2d 156. 174
(1981) (surgical privileges at other hospitals had been limited or revoked).
53. See, e.g.. id. (physician had not acquired board certification in orthopedics).
54. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman. 18 Ariz. App. 75. 500 P,2d 335. 343-45 (1972) (malprac-
tice suits against physician and hospital admissible to show notice of incompetence).
55. See. e.g., id., 500 P.2d at 344 (several previous patients called as witnesses).
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evidence will be unavailable. Furthermore, hospital staff members will
rarely agree to testify to incidents of prior negligence. 56
The most persuasive evidence of the quality of prior physician perfor-
mance is contained in the medical records of other patients. Under present
Washington law, such records could not be given to the plaintiff without
the consent of the patients whose medical care they document.57 They
are, therefore, as a practical matter, unavailable to the hospital corporate
negligence plaintiff. As a result, the plaintiff may be unable to produce
evidence on the issue of the hospital's breach of duty and so the hospital
corporate negligence action may fail.
III. PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE IN WASHINGTON LAW
The proof problems involved in a hospital corporate negligence action
can be solved without disrupting hospital quality assurance mechanisms if
the plaintiff is given access to the hospital records of former patients of
the negligent physician. 58 These records can be expunged of any identify-
ing marks by in camera review proceedings and then given to the plaintiff
for evaluation by her own experts. 59 This compromise preserves the
56. For a case where the plaintiff was successful in finding physicians to testify to prior acts of
negligence see Community Hosp. Ass'n v. District Court, 570 P.2d 243,244 (Colo. 1977).
57. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.60.060(4), which creates the physician-patient privilege, provides in
pertinent part: "A regular physician or surgeon shall not, without the consent of his patient, be exam-
ined in a civil action as to any information acquired in attending such patient, which was necessary to
enable him to prescribe or act for the patient .... "
The statute has been construed to apply to hospital records. Randa v. Bear, 50 Wn. 2d 415, 421,
312 P.2d 640, 644 (1957); Toole v. Franklin Inv. Co., 158 Wash. 696, 291 P. 1101 (1930); see also
Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 105 I11. App. 3d 850, 61 11. Dec. 651, 435 N.E.2d 140 (1982)
(hospital records protected by physician-patient privilege); Boddy v. Parker, 45 A.D.2d 1000, 358
N.Y.S.2d 218 (1974) (patient records privileged).
58. This approach has been adopted by several jurisdictions faced with the problem. See, e.g.,
Ziegler v. Superior Court, 656 P.2d 1251 (Ariz. App. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to discover records of
other pacemaker patients with all clues to identity deleted); Community Hosp. Ass'n v. District
Court, 570 P.2d 243 (Colo. 1977) (medical records of patients of neurosurgeon ordered produced
after identifying marks deleted); Louisville Gen. Hosp. v. Hellmann, 500 S.W.2d 790 (Ky. App.
1973) (one hundred random emergency room records ordered produced with patients' names, ad-
dresses, and other identifying information expunged).
One commentator has proposed that the plaintiff's proof problem be solved by placing the burden
of explanation on the hospital. Loveridge & Kimball, supra note 3, at 828-30. If the medical staff
committee records cannot be used in the hospital's defense, however, the hospital is in no better
position than the plaintiff to produce evidence on the negligence issue.
59. See Rudnick v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603, 610-11, 523 P.2d 643,
650 n. 13 (1974) (disclosure that reveals ailments but not identity would not violate physician-patient
privilege). But see Parkson v. Central DuPage Hosp., 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 61 111. Dec. 651, 435
N.E. 2d 140 (1982) (identities of patients might not remain confidential even though names deleted
from records); Boddy v. Parker, 45 App. Div. 2d 1000, 358 N.Y.S.2d 218 (1974) (discovery of other
patient records not allowed due to privileged nature of such documents).
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integrity of the quality assurance process, yet allows the plaintiff enough
data to prove a corporate negligence action.
The hospital records of former patients of the negligent physician are
peculiarly appropriate tools for a determination of hospital negligence.
Such records make up the major portion of the raw data reviewed by the
hospital's quality assurance committees. Giving the plaintiff's experts ac-
cess to this data will place them in a position similar to that of the hospi-
tal's review committee. Their subsequent criticism of the hospital's fail-
ure to limit or revoke the negligent physician's hospital privileges should
be sufficient to create a question of fact as to the hospital's breach of duty.
In addition, the hospital can be charged with notice of the medical care
reflected in such records. The records detail the physician's past perfor-
mance in caring for patients at the defendant hospital. Thus, they indicate
facts of which the hospital, through its medical staff committees, should
have been aware.
The privacy of former patients can be adequately safeguarded by
concealing their identities before the records are given to the plaintiff.
The resulting anonymity would preserve the physician-patient privilege
as well, since the free flow of information between physician and patient
that the privilege seeks to foster60 will not be hindered if the patient's
identity is protected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policy considerations that led the Washington legislature and the
court to exempt medical staff committee proceedings from discovery in
medical malpractice actions should lead to their protection in hospital cor-
porate negligence actions as well. If the protection is extended to preclude
discovery and evidentiary use of committee proceedings in such actions,
the plaintiff will have difficulty producing evidence establishing a breach
of duty on the part of the hospital. This proof problem can be overcome
by allowing the plaintiff access to the hospital records of prior patients of
the plaintiff's physician. Such a compromise will preserve the integrity of
the internal review process and still provide enough information to the
plaintiff to allow her to meet the burden of production in a hospital corpo-
rate negligence action.
Susan Ward
60. See Dept. of Social and Health Serv. v. Latta, 92 Wn. 2d 812. 819. 601 P.2d 520. 525 (1979)
(primary purpose of privilege is to create aura of confidentiality and thus promote proper medical
treatment by facilitating full disclosure of information. secondary purpose is to protect patient from
embarrassing disclosures of intimate medical details).
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